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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to examine the direct effects of labour market institu-
tions on unemployment rates in the selected EU Members. For this purpose, we
use macroeconomic cross-country, time series analysis for 21 OECD European
members over the 2001-2011 period. The results gained from our empirical ana-
lysis are rather inconclusive over the possibility to explain the development of
European unemployment solely by analysing the effects of labour market insti-
tutions. This finding might as well be caused by the volatile evolution of both
output and unemployment over the observed period. The importance of busi-
ness cycle is confirmed by our results as the measure for the output gap appears
highly significant in every model specification. Unlike the majority of previous
literature, in our estimates the proxies for macroeconomic shocks do not turn
out to be significant. Hence, we decided not to examine mutual interactions
between macroeconomic shocks and institutions.
JEL Classifications: J08, J30, J51, J64






Tato práce zkoumá dopady institucí trhu práce na míru nezaměstnanosti ve
vybraných státech Evropské Unie. Za tímto účelem jsme použili standartní
ekonometrické metody pro analýzu makroekonomických panelových dat. Náš
datový soubor byl tvořen 21 evropskými státy, které jsou zároveň členy OECD,
za období 2001-2011. Výsledky získané z empirické analýzy naznačují, že vývoj
nezaměstnanosti nelze vysvětlit pouhými dopady institucí trhu práce. Tento
fakt může být do velké míry způsoben velkými výkyvy v makroekonomických
indikátorech během sledovaného období - jak nezaměstnanost, tak HDP vykázali
velmi turbulentní vývoj. Důležitost dopadů hospodářského cyklu na nezaměst-
nanost byla potvrzena i našemi odhady - proměnná měřící mezeru mezi aktuál-
ním a potencionálním výstupem HDP byla signifikantní ve všech specifikacích
našeho modelu. Narozdíl od většiny předešlé literatury se dopady makroeko-
nomických šoků neukázali signifikantní. Z tohoto důvodu jsme odpustili od
záměru zkoumat účinky interakcí institucí trhu práce s makroekonomickými
šoky.
JEL klasifikace: J08, J30, J51, J64
Klíčová slova: nezaměstnanost, instituce trhu práce, EU, aktivní politika
zaměstnanosti
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1 Introduction
Relatively high levels of unemployment in European countries have been a ser-
ious issue since the 1960s. This is of a particular importance, since extens-
ive unemployment has negative impacts at both macroeconomic and microeco-
nomic levels. At the macroeconomic level, unemployment burdens state budget
through both lowered revenues (tax losses) and increased expenses (unemploy-
ment benefits and state contributions to a social protection system). At the
microeconomic level, unemployed individuals suffer from a lack of material re-
sources as well as from psychological deprivation and, potentially, also marginal-
ization at the society. This Master thesis attempts to a find possible relationship
between high unemployment in selected European countries and improper la-
bour market institutional set-ups1.
As a response to the OECD 1994 Jobs Study which called for fundamental
labour market reforms to tackle with persistently high unemployment, emerged
a considerable amount of macroeconomic studies focusing on the effects of labour
market institutions. Nevertheless, recently this issue has not been on the top of
the priority list of economic research agenda, as the latest studies on this topic
(e.g. Bassalini and Duval, 2006) work with a dataset ending in 2003. Therefore,
this Master thesis attempts to fill in this space and examine the possible effects of
labour market institutions on European unemployment over the turbulent 2001-
2011 period. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the only one focusing
on the European labour market institutions and unemployment in the recent
decade, and the only one examining the relationship between labour market
institutions and unemployment in the time of the recent economic and financial
crisis in the EU countries.
This thesis is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction. The
second chapter presents the list of relevant research literature which examines
the role of labour market institutions and policies for tackling unemployment.
It discusses solely the macroeconomic cross-country studies. The focus is on the
main findings provided by these studies which allow comparison with our results
obtained and described later in the thesis. The third chapter is devoted to the
1The term “selected European countries” cover 19 EU Member States which are also the
OECD Member countries, plus Norway and Switzerland. The only EU countries which are
the OECD members and are not included in our sample are Estonia and Slovenia. They were
omitted due to a significant number of missing data.
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methodology of the empirical analysis. Firstly, the dataset is described and used
variables are defined. Then it discusses the econometric tools for estimating the
effects of labour market institutions on unemployment. In the fourth chapter,
the results gained from our empirical analysis are presented. In the first section
of this chapter, the development of unemployment in European Union countries
during the observed period is described. In the second part of this chapter, the
results of different models which are applied on the panel data are elaborated.
The final chapter summarizes the key findings from the analysis. Finally, it
attempts to draw some policy implications.
2
2 State of Art
The content of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive list of the existing
research literature which examines the role of labour market institutions and
policies in unemployment rates. Only the macroeconomic cross-country studies
are considered. The emphasis is put on the main findings, but the methodo-
logical differences and issues of the selected studies are discussed as well. All
the presented papers focus on OECD countries. It is due to the fact that the
majority of scholars examining the effects of labour market institutions on un-
employment are at least party affiliated with the OECD, but more importantly,
policies and institutional indicators which are comparable across countries are
constructed solely by the OECD. The time span of the relevant literature goes
from the late 1980s to the most recent one in 2006.
2.1 The 1994 OECD Jobs Study
The pioneering cross-country studies date back to the turn of the 1980s and
the 1990s. Beam and Symons (1989) and mainly Layard et al. (1991)2 started
to research possible impacts of labour market institutions and policies on the
aggregate level of unemployment. However, most of the studies are published
after the year 1994, when the OECD came up with its Jobs Study. The OECD
1994 Jobs Study (1994) can be understood as one of the key facts that triggered
the emergence of the empirical studies focusing on labour market institutions
as main determinants of unemployment. Hence, the main findings of the 1994
Jobs Study, in particular, policy recommendations, are discussed in the following
paragraph.
The policy recommendations in the 1994 Jobs Study aim to enhance the ability
of labour markets to adjust to exogenous shocks as well as to improve condi-
tions for job creation. The tight budgetary constraints of governments were
considered, therefore most of the recommendations focus on encouragement to
actively participate in the labour force, instead of living on social welfare sup-
port. Responsibilities rising from successful policies implementation are related
2The paper written by Layard et al. in 1991 is of a particular importance as the one he co-
authors with Nickell, who, building on this paper, wrote an influential paper “Unemployment
and labor market rigidities: Europe versus North America” in 1997.
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to all participants of labour markets, not only to governments alone. In order
to improve employment performance, it is necessary to introduce both macroe-
conomic and structural reforms (OECD, 1994). The policy recommendations
are listed below, some of them might sound too general, but to describe each
and every one of them in detail is beyond the interest of this thesis.
1. “Set macroeconomic policy such that it will both encourage growth and,
in conjunction with good structural policies, make it sustainable.
2. Enhance the creation and diffusion of technological know-how by improv-
ing frameworks for its development.
3. Increase flexibility of working time (both short-term and lifetime) volun-
tarily sought by workers and employers.
4. Nurture an entrepreneurial climate by eliminating impediments to, and
restrictions on, the creation and expansion of enterprises.
5. Make wage and labour costs more flexible by removing restrictions that
prevent wages from reflecting local conditions and individual skill levels,
in particular of younger workers.
6. Reform employment security provisions that inhibit the expansion of em-
ployment in the private sector.
7. Strengthen the emphasis on active labour market policies and reinforce
their effectiveness.
8. Improve labour force skills and competences through wide-ranging changes
in education and training systems.
9. Reform unemployment and related benefit systems – and their interaction
with the tax system – such that societies’ fundamental equity goals are
achieved in ways that impinge far less on the efficient functioning of labour
markets” (OECD, 1994, p. 44-45).
The 1994 Jobs Study (1994) emphasised the necessity of fundamental labour
market reforms, in order to prevent an excessive increase in unemployment.
As a result, a number of scholars tried to address the question, whether above
mentioned recommendations are in line with the empirical evidence. In other
4
words, if the proposed institutional and policy reforms positively affect the level
of unemployment and resilience of labour markets. The review of the existing
macroeconomic cross-country literature is the content of the following section.
2.2 The Previous Cross-Country Literature
The 1994 Jobs Study initiated an effort of many scholars to put research agenda
further in this particular field, but we must not forget that it did not come out
of the blue. It was the OECD´s reaction to an unfavourable trend of labour
market worsening which had started in the 1970s and was not reversed in many
countries until the 1990s. In the following paragraphs, the most influential
studies that attempt to explain the rise in unemployment via labour market
institutions are presented. The studies are sorted chronologically.
Scarpetta (1996)
Scarpetta (1996) points out to major differences in labour market conditions
across OECD countries. From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, in Japan and
the USA, unemployment rates followed cyclical fluctuations and were able to
come back to initial values, whereas, in many European countries, unemploy-
ment rates tended to sustain high after economic turmoils suggesting that the
part of cyclical unemployment was transformed into structural (equilibrium) un-
employment3. The increase in unemployment in European countries was shortly
followed by rising of incidence of long-term unemployment4.
Scarpetta in his empirical analysis addresses how different labour market insti-
tutional set-ups affect both levels of structural unemployment and persistence of
unemployment. To that end, he uses an annual data over the 1983-1993 period
for 15 (17 based on specifications) OECD countries. To estimate the effects of
policy and institutional factors on structural unemployment, he employs a static
Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) model with random effects of coun-
try variables. Due to the fact that policies and institutions may have different
3This fact can be described by the so called hysteresis effect. The hysteresis effect in
European labour markets was in detail described by Blanchard and Summers (1986).
4Incidence of long-term unemployment is a number of long-term unemployed (for more
than 12 months) as a percentage of the total unemployed.
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impacts on different groups of population, Scarpetta uses four alternatives for
a dependent variable: i) the aggregate structural unemployment rate; ii) the
youth unemployment rate, iii) the long-term unemployment rate; iv) and the
non-employment rate. Explanatory variables are also divided into four groups.
Cyclical factors are captured by the output gap. Policy variables are: active
labour market policies (ALMP), unemployment benefits, employment protec-
tion legislation (EPL), and non-wage labour costs (tax wedge). Institutional
factors are: unions and the wage bargaining process, and as a proxy for product
market competition, exposure to trade was used. The other factors consist of
real interest rate and the terms of trade.
The main empirical findings are presented and compared with the pioneering
studies from the turn of the 1980s and the 1990s. The estimated effects of AMLP
are small and, in many cases, not statistically significant. This is against the
results gained by above mentioned Layard et al. (1991). Generous unemploy-
ment benefits appear to have a strong negative impact on unemployment rates.
Similarly, stringent EPL leads to high unemployment. High union density which
defines workers bargaining power seems to lead to higher unemployment, but if
co-ordination among employers is added to the equation, it can reduce unem-
ployment significantly, no matter of union density. The results also support the
so called hump-shaped hypothesis which suggests that both highly centralised
and fully decentralised wage bargaining systems lead to the best outcomes. In
contrast to Layard et. al (1991), the tax wedge does not have any effects on
unemployment. The other factors (real interest rate and the terms of trade) did
not contribute to unemployment over the observed period. If the persistence
of unemployment is considered, generous unemployment benefits and stringent
EPL contribute to duration of unemployment the most.
Nickell (1997, 1998)
Nickell (1997, 1998) in his two influential studies attempts to address two major
questions: what is behind much higher unemployment across all OECD coun-
tries in the 1980s and the 1990s comparing to the situation in the 1960s, and
what causes the enormous variations in unemployment across OECD countries.
To answer these questions, Nickell constructs a clear framework for examining
relationships between unemployment and labour market institutions. He uses a
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dataset over the 1983-1994 period for 20 OECD countries, but unlike Scarpetta
(1996) who works with annual data, he uses only two six-years periods (1983-
1988 and 1989-1994). This can be done mostly due to a stable character of
policy and institutional indicators. He also employs a static FGLS model with
random effects. Tree different dependent variables are used: i) the logarithm
(log) of aggregate unemployment; ii) the log of long-term unemployment; iii)
and the log of short-term unemployment. The policy and institutional explanat-
ory variables are: EPL, the replacement rate, unemployment benefits duration,
ALMP, union density, union coverage, bargaining co-ordination, and the total
tax rate. Besides, the regression encompasses a change in inflation during the
period as a proxy for short-term macroeconomic situation, a dummy for the
second period, and in Nickell (1998) also owner occupation rate as a proxy for
barriers to regional mobility.
All the policy and institutional variables are significant with expected signs, the
only exception is EPL which has no significant effect. In contrast with the results
gained by Scarpetta (1996), ALMP may substantially contribute to a reduction
of unemployment. The replacement rate, unemployment benefit duration, union
density and coverage, bargaining co-ordination, and the tax wedge all have very
significant effects on both aggregate and long-term unemployment. The results
are rather strong as we can see on the example of ALMP when an increase in
spending by 10 pp should lower the unemployment rate by 1.92 pp. Furthermore,
macroeconomic situation proxied by inflation influences unemployment as well,
and quite strongly again, as an increase in inflation by a one pp should lead to
decrease in unemployment by 1.36 %5. No matter of how strong the results look,
Nickell remains quite cautious with his answers to above mentioned questions.
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) focus on the European labour market, in par-
ticular, they attempt to explain the rise in European unemployment since the
1960s and the enormous heterogeneity in unemployment across individual coun-
tries. Unlike Scarpetta (1996) and Nickell (1997, 1998), they acknowledge the
importance of macroeconomic shocks, and mainly, interactions of shocks with
institutions. They argue that adverse shocks might as well be responsible for the
5These concrete numbers are considered for a country with 8 % of unemployment.
7
rise in unemployment, but the shocks do not differ enough to explain differences
between countries. Analogously, distinct labour market policies and institutions
might cause differences between countries, but they are not able to explain the
general trend of growing unemployment, as many of them were present at the
times of low unemployment. Therefore, the authors look at the interactions of
adverse shocks with adverse institutional set-ups as the possible explanation of
both of above mentioned phenomena.
In order to capture the evolution of European unemployment better, the au-
thors use a dataset which covers a longer period of time - from 1960-1996, with
six-years observations for 20 OECD countries6. The Non-Linear Least Squares
method is applied to estimate the effects of interactions between shocks and
institutions on unemployment. The dependent variable is the aggregate un-
employment rate. The set of policy and institutional variables is the same as
in above described Nickell (1997). Both time invariant and time-varying in-
stitutions are considered. The authors model two different specifications for
shocks. In the first one, shocks are treated as unobservable and common across
countries (time effects). In the second one, shocks are observable and country
specific7. Due to the fact that in this paper shocks (interactions) are considered
as primary determinants of unemployment for the first time, the more detailed
description of three used proxies for shocks follows.
In the 1970s, when European unemployment rates started to rise, Europe exper-
ienced a significant slowdown in total factor productivity (TFP) growth. This
fact was overshadowed by an increase in oil prices, nonetheless, the slowdown in
TFP growth appears to have played a big role in the rise of unemployment. The
question remains whether the weaker TFP growth can lead to the permanent
increase in unemployment. Dramatic changes in the real interest rate are the
other proxy for shocks. The real interest rate became negative in the 1970s
and then strongly positive in the 1980s and the 1990s8. The authors argue that
the real interest rate can influence labour demand through the accumulation
6To put more emphasis on recent years, the last two years are treated as separate obser-
vations.
7The use of both time invariant and time-varying institutions alongside with both observ-
able and unobservable shocks, leads to four different specifications of interactions.
8Here, we discuss the real interest rate, not the nominal interest rate. Thus, it does not
mean that nominal interest rates were negative in the 1970s, but that high inflation which was
present, caused real interest rates to get into negative figures. This comes from the simple
Fischer equation: r = i − π, where r denotes the real interest rate, i denotes the nominal
interest rate, and π denotes inflation.
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of capital. As in the previous case, there are doubts if the effects caused by
changes in the real interest rate can bring permanent effects on unemployment.
A shift (the decline in the 1980s and the 1990s) in labour demand is the other
shock that the authors find relevant for changes in unemployment.
The main findings over the effects of labour market institutions from this paper
are more or less in line with Nickell (1997). In contrast, but consistent with
Scarpetta (1996), effects of ALMP are negligible. Also, the coefficient for union
coverage results to be insignificant. The authors are positively surprise about
the goodness of fit of the model which seems to explain both the rise in un-
employment and its heterogeneity across countries. In particular, interactions
between institutions and shocks appear to be responsible for most of the hetero-
geneity between countries. Nonetheless, the authors are cautious with assertive
judgements pointing out tree possible caveats: the results are preliminary, time-
varying institutions lead to the weaker results (should be opposite), and the fact
that the specifications fit the data does not prove any theory.
Belot and van Ours (2001)
Belot and van Ours (2001) address the akin research question as previous stud-
ies: what is behind the different development of unemployment across OECD
countries. They refer to the fact that from the 1960s until the early 1980s, there
was more or less the similar trend (the rise in unemployment) across all OECD
countries, whereas, since then, disparities in unemployment rates between coun-
tries have grown larger. They focus on the direct effects of labour market in-
stitutions, but beyond that, they add mutual interactions between individual
institutions to the research agenda. The importance of interactions within an
institutional framework is stressed in, e.g. Freeman (1998) or Coe and Snower
(1997).
The authors construct a dataset for 18 OECD countries over the 1960-1994
period with 7 five-years observations. The coefficients are estimated by using
OLS with both country and time fixed effects. The dependent variable is the
aggregate unemployment rate. As for explanatory variables, six policy and in-
stitutional indicators are chosen, namely - the replacement rate, union density,
union coverage, tax wedge, bargaining co-ordination, and EPL. Interactions
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between these variables are allowed as well. Besides, as in Nickell (1997), infla-
tion as a proxy for the short-term macroeconomic situation is included.
The direct effects of institutions are slightly surprising and mostly unconvin-
cing. When fixed effects are not in the regression, then all the coefficients are
significant (higher EPL unexpectedly lowers unemployment), but the R-squared
is rather low (0.4). If fixed effects are introduced, R-squared of the model is
doubled (0.8), but none of the variables is significant. If interactions between
institutions are allowed, most of them are significant. For instance, the effect of
more generous unemployment benefits is amplified by higher tax wedge or, in
the case of decentralized bargaining, an increase in union density leads to higher
unemployment. This paper shall be highly regarded for introducing interactions
between institutions into the research agenda, nevertheless, it does not provide
robust evidence on the effects of these interactions.
Nunziata (2002)
Many times mentioned cross-country differences in unemployment are the con-
tent of Nunziata (2002). In his analysis, Nunziata encompasses both interactions
between institutions and shocks (as proposed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000))
and mutual interactions between institutions (as in Belot and van Ours (2001)).
Furthermore, building on his own study (Nunziata (2001)), he attempts to show
that the impact of institutions on unemployment is the same as the impact of
institutions on real labour costs. In other words, if institutions increase real
labour costs, then it is probable that they contribute to higher unemployment
as well.
Nunziata (2001) aims his work to examine the effects of institutions on the wage
determination process (labour costs). He concludes that labour market institu-
tions are greatly responsible for the rise in labour costs, under the assumption
that productivity is controlled (Nunziata, 2001). Daveri and Tabellini (2000)
focus their research in a similar direction. They examine a possible impact of
taxation on unemployment and GDP growth. They suggest that higher labour
taxation inevitably leads to greater labour costs, and subsequently, to an in-
crease in unemployment and slower GDP growth. According to their findings,
higher labour taxes have been shifted onto higher real wages which has forced
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firms to substitute labour force with capital (Daveri and Tabellini, 2000). It
would surely be worthwhile to devote more attention to this appealing paper,
but its content stands a bit aside of the interest of this work.
Nunziata (2002) works with annual observations over the 1960-1995 period for
20 OECD countries. The dependent variable is aggregate unemployment. On
the right side of the equation, he uses a set of labour market institutions (very
much the same as Nickell (1997), thus it is not described again). He also includes
mutual interactions between institutions, both fixed country and time specific
country effects, year dummies, and the vector for macroeconomic shocks which
consists of: labour demand shocks, TFP shocks, money supply shocks, the
long term real interest rate, and the terms of a trade shocks. He also presents
a specification in which the Oswald´s Home Ownership variable (a proxy for
labour mobility) is included9. Every regression is estimated by fixed effects
FGLS model accounting for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
The empirical results confirm the conjecture from Nunziata (2001) that labour
market institutions have the same impact on unemployment as on real labour
costs. The other findings are mainly in line with the previous literature - gener-
ous benefits, tax wedge, and union density contribute to higher unemployment,
EPL is not significant. Furthermore, these effects are amplified by mutual in-
teractions between institutions. The hump shaped hypothesis is not confirmed
by the data. The most of macroeconomic shocks have significant effects on the
evolution of unemployment. All in all, Nunziata offers a comprehensive analysis
of the impact of institutions, their mutual interactions and interactions between
institutions and shocks on the level of unemployment. Moreover, he exceeds
other scholars in methodological punctuality and, mostly in Nunziata (2001),
he points out to many econometric shortcomings that cross-country studies in-
evitably face.
Baker et al. (2003)
The previous studies are mostly optimistic, even though cautiously, about the
possibility to explain the rise in unemployment and its heterogeneity across
countries through different labour market institutions. On the contrary, Baker et
9For detailed information, we refer to Oswald (1996). Nonetheless, the variable does not
appear significant in the regression.
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al. (2003) support the hypothesis that labour market institutions are responsible
only for a minor part of the evolution of unemployment from the 1960s to the
1990s. In order to verify their hypothesis, the authors firstly examine whether
there is a simple correlation between individual institutions and unemployment
over the 1980s and the 1990s. The findings are surprisingly unambiguous -
if individual institutions are gradually plotted against unemployment, there is
hardly any correlation. Only the replacement rate appears to be correlated with
unemployment, but if Spain as an outlier is removed, then even this correlation
disappears. On the other hand, a predicative value of such a simple correlation
is very limited, thus the authors construct an empirical model based on the
previous studies.
The authors use a dataset for 20 OECD countries over the 1960-1999 period
with five-years observations. The dataset exceeds previous ones, because some
of the missing observations from 1960s are filled, but mostly due to the fact
that it covers the late 1990s when many OECD countries experienced a sharp
decline in unemployment, thus it might offer a new perspective into the research
agenda. They employ various models based on the previous studies - Nickell
(1997), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Belot and van Ours (2001), and others.
They pay particular attention to Nickell (1997), in fact, they re-estimate the
model with the augmented data and new versions of institutional indicators.
The gained results differ markedly from the original ones, as none of the institu-
tional variables turns out significant. Later, the more complex model allowing
also for interactions between institutions is constructed. The results are also
inconclusive leaving a substantial part of the evolution of unemployment unex-
plained. Overall, the authors attempt to emphasise the lack of robustness in
empirical evidence of the impact of labour market institutions on unemploy-
ment. According to them, the recommended deregulation of labour markets
suggested by the OECD (1994) is based on the ambiguous empirical findings.
Bassanini and Duval (2006)
Baker et al. (2003) conclude that the lack of robustness and high sensitivity of
results on chosen model specifications are still present in the existing research
literature. Bassanini and Duval (2006) address this drawback, and by using aug-
mented indicators of policies and institutions, they aim to provide more reliable
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empirical results which could work as a basis for assessing actual labour market
policies. Realising the criticism, they, unlike some of the previous scholars, put
a strong emphasis on distinguishing which findings are robust and which are
not. To this purpose, as complex analysis as possible is used. The direct effects
of institutions, the effects of mutual interactions between institutions and, the
indirect effects of institutions via their interactions with macroeconomic shocks
on unemployment are subsequently considered.
To estimate all model specifications a dataset with annual observations over the
1982-2003 period for 20 OECD countries is used. Aggregate unemployment is
the dependent variable for all specifications. When estimating the direct ef-
fects of institutions, an output gap measure, country and time fixed effects, and
a set of policy and institutional measures are at the right side of the regres-
sion equation. The output gap measure is substituted by TFP shocks, terms
of trade shocks, real interest rate shocks, and labour demand shocks in some
specifications. In addition to standard policy and institutional variables, anti-
competitive product market regulation is included.
The authors come to a conclusion that the direct effects of institutions can ex-
plain two thirds of the evolution of unemployment over the observed period, if
the business cycle is controlled. The impact of individual institutions is more
or less in line with previous studies. Extensive sensitive analysis verified that
the main findings are robust. The model seems to fit the data perfectly as
the R-squared exceeds 0.9 in all cases. In the model where mutual interactions
between institutions are allowed, some of them appear to be significant and
robust. In particular, high spending on ALMP seems to mitigate the negat-
ive impact of generous unemployment benefits. Although the direct effects of
institutions appear to be fundamental for explaining the development of un-
employment, the indirect effects via interactions with macroeconomic shocks
significantly contribute to unemployment patterns as well. All four proxies for
the macroeconomic shocks negatively influence unemployment rates. There is
also robust evidence that interactions with institutions can either amplify or
dampen the negative effects of these shocks. For instance, generous unemploy-
ment benefits tend to amplify the negative effects, whereas highly co-ordinated
wage bargaining systems dampen these effects.
Bassanini and Duval (2006) offer the most comprehensive study dealing with
the connection between labour market institutions and unemployment rates.
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They are very much aware of the methodological drawbacks of the previous
studies. And through incorporating all the major existing approaches, they
address the issue of the lack of robustness which is strongly present in the
preceding literature.
Other relevant studies
In the following paragraphs, cross-country studies which stand a bit aside from
the main stream of the relevant literature, but still managed to contribute to
the question of the effects of labour market institutions, are briefly discussed10.
Bertola et al. (2007) focus on the impact of labour market institutions on
employment (unemployment) patterns of different demographic groups, mostly
on the disadvantageous groups - youth, older individuals, and women. They
come to the several interesting remarks which may be useful for both theory
and policymakers, for instance, high influence of unions in wage setting process
leads to lower youth and elderly employment and higher unemployment among
women (Bertola et al., 2007).
Boon and Van Ours (2004) attempt to explain how effective different ALMP are
in reducing unemployment and bringing people back to work. Generally, ALMP
seem to reduce unemployment, unsurprisingly, some programmes appear to be
more effective than the others. Among the most effective measures belongs
labour market training. On the other hand, the higher unemployment benefits
lower unemployment rates far less significantly and subsidizing jobs seems not
to work at all. These findings concerning effectiveness of ALMP are considered
from the macroeconomic perspective, the microeconomic literature on ALMP
exhibit substantially different results - the effects of labour market training
are not as persuasive (for an example of a micro evaluation study see Martin
and Grubb (2001)). These results shed some light on the impact of ALMP on
unemployment - on an important piece of the complex puzzle (Boon and Van
Ours, 2004).
The importance of product market regulation on unemployment rates is acknow-
ledged in some recent studies (e.g. Bassanini and Duval, 2006). Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2005) examine thoroughly whether various levels of product market
10These studies usually address in detail one particular fragment of labour market institu-
tional set-up and its impact on unemployment.
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regulation have any effects on functioning of labour markets. In particular, the
authors look at outcomes of interactions between labour market institutions
and product market policies. They conclude that product market regulation,
which prevents competition and free entry into markets, significantly lowers
employment. Vice versa, product market deregulation might work as a useful
complement to labour market reforms which aim to reduce unemployment and
rigidities (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005).
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3 Methodology
This chapter, based on the previous theoretical chapter, discusses the chosen
strategy for our empirical analysis. The whole dataset as well as individual
variables are described in detail.
3.1 Description of the Data and the Variables
The aim of this work is to examine the effects of labour market policy and in-
stitutional indicators on the unemployment rates in the EU. The reliable mac-
roeconomic labour market policy and institutional indicators are published only
by the OECD, therefore only EU Member States which are also members of
the OECD are considered in our analysis. The dataset covers 19 EU coun-
tries, namely: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom, plus two other
European countries: Norway and Switzerland. Two EU Member States that are
also OECD Member countries have to be omitted from the sample due to a sig-
nificant number of missing observations (Estonia and Slovenia)11. The dataset
is over the 2001-2011 period with annual observations. The time span of the
dataset is determined by availability of the data. Most of the data are obtained
from the OECD. The source of each data is in detail described at the list of the
variables below.
The following list depicts the basic variables used in the empirical analysis. In
some model specifications, the variables are also transformed, mostly to the
logarithmic transformation. At every variable, definition, source, and data ad-
justments are noted. Below the list of variables, summary statistics of the
variables are depicted in table 1.
11The possible reason for so many missing observations for Estonia and Slovenia, might be
the fact that both countries joined the OECD quite recently - in 2010. Nonetheless, we believe
that excluding these countries from analysis will not diminish the relevance of gained results
for the EU labour market.
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3.1.1 Dependent Variables
Unemployment rate (urt1564 )
Definition: Number of unemployed persons in working age population (persons
aged 15 to 64 years) divided by the labour force. The methodology of measuring
is based on national Labour Force Surveys.
Source: OECD (2014a), Online OECD Employment Database.
Structural unemployment (surhp)
Definition: Structural component of aggregate unemployment (also called core
or equilibrium unemployment) gained from urt1564 by using Hodrick-Prescott
filter with smoothing parameter λ = 100.
Source: OECD (2014a), Online OECD Employment Database, author´s calcu-
lations.
Long-term unemployment (ltur)
Definition: Number of long-term unemployed persons (12 months or more) di-
vided by the labour force.
Source: Eurostat (2014a), Employment and unemployment (Labour Force Sur-
vey). In case of Switzerland, World Bank (2014), World Development Indicators.
3.1.2 Independent Variables - Policy and Institutional Indicators
Average unemployment net benefit replacement rate (anrr)
Definition: Average net (after any tax and social security contributions have
been deducted) replacement rate excluding social assistance and housing bene-
fits across two income levels (67 and 100 % of average wage (AW)) and three
family situations (single, one-earner couple, two-earner couple).
Source: OECD (2014b), Tax-Benefit Models
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Initial unemployment net benefit replacement rate (nrr1 )
Definition: Average net replacement rate for the initial phase of unemployment
(during the first year) excluding social assistance and housing benefits for single
earner with 67 % of AW .
Source: OECD (2014b), Tax-Benefit Models
Unemployment benefit duration (ubendur)
Definition: Ratio of average to initial net benefit replacement rate.
Source: OECD (2014b), Tax-Benefit Models
Tax wedge (twcoup)
Definition: Difference between labour costs to the employer and the corres-
ponding net take-home pay of the employee for a single-earner couple with two
children earning 100% of AW.
Source: OECD (2014c), Taxing Wages Database
Employment protection legislation (epl)
Definition: Overall indicator of the stringency of employment protection. It
measures the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups
of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or tem-
porary work agency contracts.
Source: OECD (2014a), Online OECD Employment Database, author´s calcu-
lations.
Data adjustments: In the year 2008, there was a change in methodology of
measuring epl.
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Trade union density (tudens)
Definition: Trade union density rate - the percentage of employees who are
members of a trade-union.
Source: OECD (2014a), Online OECD Employment Database.
Degree of corporatism (corp - highcorp, intcorp, lowcorp)
Definition: Indicator of the degree of centralisation/co-ordination of the wage
bargaining processes, which takes values 1 for decentralised and unco-ordinated
processes, and 2 and 3 for intermediate and high degrees of centralisation/co-
ordination, respectively (Bassalini and Duval, 2006).
Source: Bassalini and Duval (2006), OECD (2004), Employment Outlook, European
Trade Union Institute (2014).
Data adjustments: In original data from OECD (2004), five-year averages clas-
sify countries with the scale 0-5 from the least to the most corporatist ones.
Bassalini and Duval (2006) rescaled the indicator along a 1-3 scale. The indic-
ator exhibits a stable nature. Therefore the latest values (from the year 2003)
from Bassalini and Duval (2006) were considered alongside with the values for
collective bargaining coverage from European Trade Union Institute (2014) to
divide countries into three groups - highcorp, intcorp, and lowcorp.
Public expenditures on active labour market policies (almpu)
Definition: Public expenditures on active labour market programmes expressed
in percentages of GDP, divided by the unemployment rate (urt1564). As the
active programmes, the categories 20-70 by the OECD´s classifications are con-
sidered.
Source: OECD (2014a), Online OECD Employment Database, Eurostat (2014b),
Labour Market Policy database.
Data adjustments: In the OECD (2014a) some observations were missing, thus
they were added from Eurostat (2014b). The data for the United Kingdom in
years 2001-2003 and 2010-2011 were linearly extrapolated.
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Minimum wage (rminmed)
Definition: Ratio of statutory minimum wage to median wage in percentages.
Source: OECD (2014a), Online OECD Employment Database.
Data adjustments: The relevant data on statutory minimum wage are published
only by the OECD and only for 21 countries, out of which 8 of the selected
countries are missing. Thus, rminmed is used only in some model specifications.
3.1.3 Independent Variables - Macroeconomic indicators
Output gap (outgap)
Definition: Measure of the gap between actual and potential output as a per-
centage of potential output.
Source: OECD (2013), Economic Outlook.
Terms of trade shock (totshock)
Definition: Logarithm of the relative price of imports weighted by the share of
imports in GDP, i.e. totschock = (MY ) ∗ log(
PM
PY
), where M and Y denote total
imports and GDP in nominal terms, respectively, and PMPY is the ratio of the
deflator of total imports to the GDP deflator (Bassalini and Duval, 2006).
Source: OECD (2013), Economic Outlook, author´s calculations.
Real interest shock (rintshock)
Definition: Difference between the 10-year nominal government bond yield (in
%) and the annual change in the GDP deflator (in %) (Bassalini and Duval,
2006).
Source: OECD (2013), Economic Outlook, author´s calculations.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, 2001-2011
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
urt1564 231 7.220 3.826 1.565 21.340
surhp 231 7.197 3.386 2.116 19.978
ltu 231 3.164 2.579 0.300 12.300
Institutional Variables
anrr 231 39.876 15.015 19.401 72.308
nrr1 231 63.268 16.423 18 88
ubendur 231 0.670 0.301 0.301 1.593
twcoup 231 22.170 8.392 5.557 38.808
epl 231 2.613 0.459 1.677 4.095
tudens 231 32.902 19.564 7.543 78.052
highcorp 231 0.380 0.486 0 1
intcorp 231 0.285 0.452 0 1
lowcorp 231 0.333 0.472 0 1
almpu 231 0.098 0.079 0.004 0.489
rminmed 143 0.470 0.059 0.345 0.618
Macroeconomic Variables
outgap 231 0.647 3.073 -7.785 9.478
totshock 231 -0.341 0.200 -0.829 0.184
rintshock 231 2.211 2.418 -6.456 14.701
Source: Author´s calculations on the basis of the data sources described in the
list of the variables.
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3.2 Model Specification
To determine the effects of policy and institutional indicators on unemployment,
we employ standard econometric tools for cross-country, time-series analysis. In
the following section, we examine only the direct effects of policy and institu-
tional indicators, thus interactions between institutions and shocks are omitted.
The econometric model is in line with theoretical models of labour market equi-
librium, such as a standard job-search model presented in Pissarides (2000).




βjXjit + γGit + εit,
where subscript i represents cross-sectional units and t refers to time-periods,
Uit is the unemployment rate (urt1564 ), αis the intercept, X
j
it is the set of policy
and institutional indicators, Git is the measure of the output gap (outgap), εit is
the disturbance term, and βs and γ are coefficients.
In some model specifications, instead of urt1564 , surhp and ltur are used as
the dependent variable, as well as a logarithmic transformation of urt1564. The
measure for macroeconomic situation which is proxied by outgap is substituted
in some specifications by the shock variables - totshock and rintshock. The set
of policy and institutional indicators contains the following items:
βjXjit = β1anrr+β2nrr1+β3ubendur+β4twcoup+β5epl+β6tudens+β7corp+β8almpu.
For the empirical estimations, the standard econometric techniques for panel
data are used. Firstly, we apply pooled OLS model which neglects the panel
structure of the data and simply estimates coefficients. Later, we employ meth-
ods that allow us to deal with the omitted variable bias problem within panel
data. Particularly, the fixed-effects (FE) model which assumes that there might
be some information within the individual entities which may bias the pre-
dictor. In other words, individual countries´ error terms are correlated with the
explaining variables. Individual fixed effects remove the impact of these time-
invariant characteristics on the predictor. At the same basis works the least
squares dummy variable (LSDV) model which enables to capture individual
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characteristics of each country through the set of dummy variables. In the situ-
ation when we assume that time-invariant characteristics of individual countries
are correlated (error terms across countries are correlated), it is more plausible
to employ the random-effects model (RE). The RE model assumes that indi-
vidual time-invariant characteristics are uncorrelated with explaining variables
and therefore also with a dependent variable. To distinguish whether FE or RE
estimator is more suitable, we use the Hausman specification test. This test as
well as the other relevant tests are described together with the empirical results
in the next chapter.
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4 Empirical Results
The following chapter presents the main findings gained from our empirical
research. Before focusing on the effects of the labour market institutions on the
unemployment rates, the development of unemployment in the EU during the
observed period is analysed.
4.1 Development of Unemployment in the EU
The first decade of the New Millennium was a turbulent time for all sectors
of European economies. The European labour market was not an exception.
One of the most closely followed indicator of the labour market - unemploy-
ment rate (depicted in figure 1); shows that the labour market conditions had
been worsening until the year 2004, when unemployment in Europe reached the
top12. Since 2004 until the second half of the year 2008, the cyclical component
of unemployment was lowering the unemployment rates in Europe significantly.
This trend was stronger in EU2113 where, in the year 2008, cyclical unemploy-
ment lowered unemployment by -1.59 p.p. It is remarkable that the evolution of
structural unemployment (gained by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter) in older
Member States (EU15) and EU21 differs notably. In EU15, there is a clear-cut
trend of rising of core unemployment, whereas in EU21 core unemployment re-
mained quite stable. Disregarding these differences, both EU15 and EU21 was
heavily hit by the financial turmoil which subsequently led to a steep increase
in the European unemployment rates.
12If not stated otherwise, the term “unemployment rate” denotes in the previous chapter
described urt1564.
13The term EU21 represents the 21 Member States of the EU which are also members of
the OECD. Thus in EU21, there are additional countries which were a part of the EU 2004
Enlargement - Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
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Figure 1: Unemployment Rates, 2001-2011
Source: Author´s calculations on the basis of the OECD (2014a).
In the previous paragraph, we are describing the basic evolution of unemploy-
ment on the aggregate (European) level. It is vital to point out that there has
been considerable variation in the rates of unemployment between European
countries. From the scatter plot (figure 2), it is visible that every year there
are outliers that mark countries with distinctively higher unemployment than
the rest of the sample. In the first years, only Poland and the Slovak Repub-
lic had significantly higher unemployment, on the other end of the spectrum,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland stood below the others. From
2002, the countries started to converge to each other and in 2007, there were
hardly any outliers. The response of the labour markets to the financial crisis
was heterogeneous, therefore the countries started to diverge again.
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Figure 2: Unemployment Rates, 2001-2011
Source: Author´s calculations on the basis of the OECD (2014a).
Table 2 lists basic summary statistics of the unemployment rates to support
the above mentioned development with numeric values. From every statistic,
the trend of initial convergence, which was followed by divergence caused by
the financial crisis, is apparent. It might be the most evident on the variation,
which decreased from initial 19.82 to 4.51 in 2008, only to grew again to 19.97
in 2011. The standard deviation followed precisely the same trend. In the
lowest unemployment countries, unemployment was raising in the first half of the
observed period, until the economic boom reversed this trend. The crisis caused
a strong increase in unemployment again with the minimum unemployment
remaining 1.5 % higher than in 2001. The maximum unemployment rates in
the Europe developed similarly like previous statistics. The big difference is
that countries which used to have the highest unemployment - Slovakia and
Poland, were swapped at the “bottom” of the sample by the countries that were
hit the most severely by the crisis - Spain, Greece, and Ireland. The individual
26
development is further discussed in the following paragraphs. The relationship
of mean and median is definitely worth pointing. Outlining countries with really
high unemployment kept mean above median for most of the years. Nonetheless,
the final values of both variables stood 1.5 p.p. respectively 2 p.p. higher then
the initial values.
Table 2: Summary Statistics, Unemployment, 2001-2011
Statistics 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Min 1.809 3.691 4.497 2.557 3.206 3.344
Max 19.330 19.986 18.032 11.040 18.116 21.769
Mean 7.279 7.950 8.106 6.528 8.331 9.232
Median 6.808 7.892 8.028 7.006 8.328 8.260
Std. Dev. 4.452 3.994 3.422 2.161 3.181 4.469
Variation 19.820 15.955 11.713 4.670 10.118 19.972
Source: Author´s calculations on the basis of the OECD (2014a).
European countries differed in absolute values of unemployment, but also in the
actual development of unemployment during the observed period (graphically
in figure 3). We can roughly divide the sample in three categories - the first
category consists of the countries whose level of unemployment remained quite
stable (we focus more on the initial and the final years and not on the fluctu-
ations due to the economic boom and subsequently the recession), the second
category is represented by the countries that experienced a steep increase in
unemployment, and the third category represents countries which managed to
lower their initially very high levels of unemployment.
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Figure 3: Unemployment Rates and Structural Unemployment, 2001-
2011
Source: Author´s calculations on the basis of the OECD (2014a).
The last but one column in table 3 presents the absolute difference in unemploy-
ment between the final year (2011) and the initial year (2001) of the observed
period. The very last column shows the same difference but in relative values
to the year 2001, i.e. ∆(11− 01)% = (urt15642011 − urt15642001)/urt15642001.
If we look at the absolute values, the countries whose unemployment stayed
around the initial values are for instance Austria, France or Norway. The rel-
ative values yield us the same countries for this category. It is not surprising
that the countries which were hit the most severely by the post-financial crisis
recession, suffered the biggest increase in the unemployment rate - Spain 11.24
%, Ireland 10.93 % or Portugal 9.12 %. If we take into account the relative
values then we get a bit different picture. Unemployment in 2011 compared to
2001 in Ireland rose by hardly imaginable 278 p.p., it was 214 p.p. in Portugal
and 172 p.p. in Luxembourg. In Spain, which was on the top of the list in the
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absolute increase, the relative increase was “only” 106 p.p. There are, however,
other countries whose evolution of absolute values do not look so severe, but in
the relative terms, the increase was quite significant - 83 p.p. in Denmark, 76
p.p. in the Netherlands or 67 p.p. in the United Kingdom. Although we get
an interesting outlook from the relative values, the fact that the level of unem-
ployment directly influences people´s lives as well as a functioning of economies,
the absolute values might as well stay the most important indicator, as we can
hardly state that the increase in the unemployment rate from 1.80 % to 4.93 %
in Luxembourg was more devastating that the increase from 10.52 % to 21.76
% in Spain.
Table 3: Unemployment Rates, 2001-2011
Country 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 ∆(11− 01) ∆(11− 01)%
AUS 3.59 4.31 5.19 4.46 4.84 4.20 0.60 16.86
BEL 6.21 8.21 8.50 7.50 7.95 7.19 0.98 15.80
CZE 8.18 7.82 7.97 5.37 6.75 6.80 -1.37 -16.83
DNK 4.21 5.47 4.89 3.83 6.10 7.71 3.50 83.21
FIN 9.11 9.03 8.44 6.91 8.38 7.86 -1.25 -13.77
FRA 8.63 8.48 8.91 8.03 9.15 9.25 0.61 7.15
DEU 7.90 9.36 11.28 8.74 7.83 6.01 -1.89 -23.98
GRC 10.41 9.88 9.99 8.40 9.61 17.88 7.47 71.74
HUN 5.72 5.89 7.25 7.40 10.07 11.01 5.28 92.33
IRL 3.92 4.70 4.82 4.86 12.45 14.85 10.93 278.81
ITA 9.59 8.74 7.82 6.17 7.89 8.52 -1.07 -11.18
LUX 1.80 3.69 4.49 4.07 5.15 4.93 3.12 172.71
NLD 2.51 4.15 5.29 3.61 3.73 4.44 1.93 76.93
NOR 3.49 4.51 4.66 2.55 3.20 3.34 -0.15 -4.29
POL 18.59 19.98 18.03 9.71 8.27 9.75 -8.83 -47.53
PRT 4.25 6.65 8.07 8.47 10.02 13.37 9.12 214.56
SVK 19.33 17.55 16.19 11.04 12.09 13.58 -5.75 -29.75
ESP 10.52 11.35 9.20 8.31 18.11 21.76 11.24 106.83
SWE 5.07 5.83 7.76 6.22 8.45 7.93 2.86 56.47
CHE 2.51 4.21 4.51 3.71 4.20 4.13 1.62 64.54
GBR 4.78 4.88 4.71 5.33 7.83 7.99 3.21 67.29
EU21 8.50 9.01 9.09 7.29 9.11 9.70 1.20 14.12
EU15 7.40 7.96 8.24 7.10 9.19 9.69 2.29 30.93
Source: Author´s calculations on the basis of the OECD (2014a).
The countries that managed to lower their unemployment rates are the Visegrad
countries with the exception of Hungary, which was initially characterised by
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the very good functioning of the labour market, but unlike the other post-
communist Central European countries, it suffered the substantial increase in
unemployment during the observed period. Still at the beginning of the 21st
century both Slovakia and Poland faced very high post-transformation levels of
unemployment. Especially in Poland, the situation was really severe and many
of Polish unemployed sought for jobs in other European countries (Kowalska
and Strielkowski, 2013). In years 2006 and 2007, the extremely strong growth
of GDP in both countries (both years more than 6 % in Poland and in Slovakia
even more - 8.3 % respectively 10.5 %) caused an unprecedented acceleration
of jobs creation which subsequently led to an extreme drop in unemployment
rates. This trend was stopped by the financial crisis, nevertheless, a decrease
by 8.83 p.p. in Poland is quite remarkable. The Czech Republic was in a dif-
ferent situation as, by most of the scholars anticipated and abrupt increase in
unemployment after the transformation did not occur. The term “Czech un-
employment miracle” was also used. This situation, however, did not reflect
the true face of the Czech labour market. It was eventually revealed by the
negative effects of the monetary crisis in 1997 (Flek et al., 2004). Ever since
the unemployment rate oscillated around 8 %, only until an overheating of the
economy in years 2005-2007 lowered unemployment to the artificially low levels
(Strielkowski and Hněvkovský, 2013). Disregarding the post-crisis increase, un-
employment in the Czech Republic fell by 1.37 p.p. during the observed period.
This section outlines the development of unemployment in selected EU countries
over the 2001-2011 period. We focused on both aggregate (European) and indi-
vidual (country) levels. On the aggregate level, we can observe a common trend
of initial growing of unemployment which was reversed by the rapid economic
growth causing the steep drop in unemployment, only to be followed by the
abrupt post-crisis increase. Still we must not forget that the European labour
market is a very heterogeneous space in which countries tent to exhibit substan-
tially diverse levels of unemployment - from around 3 % in Norway up to more
than 20 % in Spain in year 2011. Besides the differences in absolute values,
the countries were also characterised by various developments in relative terms.
The aim of this section was to provide better understanding of the development
of unemployment in this turbulent period so that we can more easily evaluate
possible effects of labour market institutions and policies on unemployment in
the next section.
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4.2 The Effects of Labour Market Institutions on Unem-
ployment
The main aim of this thesis is to estimate the effects of labour market institutions
on unemployment rates in Europe. Hence, we employ the standard econometric
methods on our dataset of 21 countries over 11 years. This section is organised
in following manner: firstly we define six different model specifications which we
want to estimate, then these specifications are estimated gradually by pooled
OLS model, LSDV model, FE model, and RE model, and finally these models
are mutually compared to find out which one yields the best results. At every
model, the requisite assumptions are checked. Each of the used models can
exhibit distinct results. Our strategy will be to comment the results yielded
from particular models gradually and then critically evaluate them to find the
most reasonable outcomes of our analysis.
4.2.1 Model Specifications
We have defined these six model specifications14:
1) Baseline (bs) specification is defined as in the previous methodological chapter,
i.e.:
urt1564 = anrr+nrr1+ubendur+twcoup+epl+tudens+corp+almpu+outgap.
2) In the second specification (sh), we substitute the measure of a macroeco-
nomic situation (outgap) with two variables aiming to control for cycles fluc-
tuations (totshock) and (rintshock). It is both due to the fact that the studies
which this work is based on (Bassalini and Duval, 2006; Blanchard and Wolfers
2000, and others) used this strategy, but also because the variables that control
business cycle fluctuations might significantly contribute to an explanation of
the evolution of unemployment in this very turbulent period of time.
urt1564 = anrr + nrr1 + ubendur + twcoup + epl + tudens + corp + almpu +
totshock + rintshock.
14The aim is to list the variables which are used in the specifications, not a correct econo-
metric term of the equations, therefore coefficients and constants are not mentioned.
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3) The third specification (mw) incorporates (rminmed) to examine if higher
minimal wage tends to increase unemployment. Unfortunately, a reliable meas-
ure of statutory minimal wage is available only for 13 out of 21 countries. Hence,
the panel to stay strongly balanced, we have to use only 143 observations in this
specification.
urt1564 = anrr + nrr1 + ubendur + twcoup + epl + tudens + corp + almpu +
outgap+ rminmed.
4) The forth specification (log) uses a logarithmic transformation of both the
dependent variable and the independent variables (with the exception of out-
gap). We come out of previous studies (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell 1997 and 1998)
to analyse whether the logarithmic transformation fits the data better. More




5) In the fifth specification (su), the dependent variable urt1564 is replaced
by structural unemployment (surph) which is filtered from urt1564 by using
the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The idea is to filter the cycle component of unem-
ployment and then use the set of institutional variables (of course without the
outgap) to examine to which extent can institutions explain core unemployment.
surhp = anrr + nrr1 + ubendur + twcoup+ epl + tudens+ corp+ almpu.
6) The sixth specification (ltu) aims at analysing the effects of institutions on
one of the most painful phenomenon of the European labour market - high
shares of long-term unemployed. Unlike the previous specification, the variable
outgap stays in the equation. We assume that this variable should be significant
as there are channels through which business cycle affects
long-term unemployment. One of the possible mechanisms is the hysteresis effect
which says that a part of people, who are made redundant due to economic
recession, becomes long-term unemployed because they lose work habits and
they stay unemployed or out of the labour force even after an economy recovers.
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ltu = anrr+nrr1 +ubendur+ twcoup+ epl+ tudens+ corp+ almpu+ outgap.
4.2.2 Pooled OLS
Firstly, we estimate our model specifications by using pooled OLS model. It
is a model which do not consider a structure of the panel, but simply pool the
data together and estimate coefficients15. In order to check the classical as-
sumptions of OLS model, we run the baseline specification. Both White test
and Breusch-Pagan test strongly reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
In case that residuals are not homoskedastic, it can lead to biased estimates of
coefficients. Especially, in values of standard errors and with that connected
levels of significance. As possible remedies, we can use a regression with options
robust or cluster. We tried both options, but due to the fact that Stata already
incorporates a number of clusters into the robust option, both methods yields
the same results. We mentioned that heteroskedasticity can lead to biased es-
timates of coefficients. In our case, the robust regressions did not cause the
different values of points coefficients, but the coefficients of the standard errors
were larger, which caused that some of the variables stopped being significant.
In the pooled OLS model, the issue of the insignificant coefficients was not so
substantive, but with FE model, the robust option eliminated some of the signi-
ficant variables. Unfortunately, looking over assumptions and other econometric
flaws are present in some of the previous studies. We dare to say that this was
one of the reasons of such unambiguous and conclusive results of many studies.
15All the estimations are done in Stata software. The pivotal commands from Stata are
enclosed in appendix.
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Figure 4: Q-Q plot and Histogram, Pooled OLS, Bs
Source: Author´s calculations based on the sources from the list of variables.
The other assumption that needs to be tested is normality of residuals. Shapiro-
Wilk test rejects normality. On the basis of graphical tests - Q-Q plot and
histogram of residuals, we reject normality as well, with an ascertainment that
residuals are positively skewed (Figure 4). Nonetheless, the robust regression
should deal with this imperfections. Furthermore, we want to find out if there is
a problem of collinearity among the independent variables. Table 4 depicts the
pairwise correlation between the explaining variables. In the last column of the
table, the values for the variance inflation factor (VIF) are presented. There is a
conventional benchmark that if the VIF exceeds 10, then this variable is highly
correlated and should be addressed. In our sample, none of the variables fulfils
this condition, thus we do not have to take further actions. The most correlated
variable is ubendur, especially with anrr and nrr1, which is not surprising if we
consider that this variable is a ratio of both variables.
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix and VIF, Pooled OLS, Bs
Variable anrr nrr1 ubendur twcoup epl tundens corp almu outgap VIF
anrr 1.000 7.39
nrr1 0.389 1.000 7.10
ubendur 0.508 -0.516 1.000 8.49
twcoup 0.299 0.068 0.173 1.000 1.92
epl 0.026 0.400 -0.442 -0.087 1.000 2.60
tundens 0.425 0.240 0.179 0.517 -0.236 1.000 1.82
corp 0.550 0.452 0.036 0.478 0.475 0.344 1.000 3.15
almu 0.587 0.543 0.052 0.337 0.016 0.430 0.480 1.000 2.32
outgap 0.001 -0.079 0.074 -0.117 -0.085 0.024 -0.031 0.159 1.000 1.14
Source: Author´s calculations based on the sources from the list of variables.
In table 5, the results for six specifications of pooled OLS model are presented.
In the baseline specification, five of the variables appear to be significant on the
1% level of significance - all three variables connected with unemployment bene-
fits alongside with the measure for macroeconomic situation and ALMP. Gen-
erous unemployment benefits may contribute to higher unemployment mostly
through two channels. Firstly, it can affect the job-matching process due to
lowered job-search intensity of unemployed and their willingness to accept jobs.
Hora (2008) confirms this hypothesis from the microeconomic perspective sug-
gesting that even if staying on unemployment benefits is not a preferred strategy
for most of unemployed, they demand an income from active work to be dis-
tinctively higher than income guaranteed in case of unemployment. If this
condition is not fulfilled (high replacement rates or relatively low wages), it can
lead to above mentioned lowered job-search intensity. Secondly, generous unem-
ployment benefits relatively lower opportunity costs of unemployment, hence it
enables unemployed to have higher wage expectations. At the aggregate level,
this can lead to wage pressures which negatively affect vacancies (Bassalini and
Duval, 2006).
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Table 5: Unemployment Equation, Pooled OLS, 2001-2011

















































































































Observations 231 231 143 231 231 231
R-squared 0.474 0.456 0.594 0.586 0.412 0.491
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** ,*** denote
statistical significance at 15%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. In the 3rd spe-
cification (log) all the variables are in logarithmic form, with the exception of
outgap.
Source: Author´s calculations based on the sources from the list of variables.
Nonetheless, unemployment benefits can have favourable impacts on unemploy-
ment as well. More generous unemployment benefits, mostly the initial benefits
after losing a job, enable unemployed to maintain some required standard level
of living, with which they have more chances to find better matched job (Bassa-
lini and Duval, 2006). This might prevent a future loss of a job. Furthermore,
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a certain level of unemployment benefits is considered to be socially desirable.
Most of the previous studies conclude that the unfavourable effects of generous
unemployment benefits overshadow the favourable ones - leads to higher un-
employment (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell 1998; Blanchard and Wolfers 2000; and
others).
Before discussing our results, we need to make a small methodological remark.
In our regressions, a positive sign in front of a variable´s coefficient means that
the variable contributes to higher unemployment. If we state “a variable has
a positive effect on unemployment”, it means that it contributes to higher un-
employment. We believe that preserving this mathematical notation will be
less confusing. In the baseline specification, actually in all specifications es-
timated by pooled OLS, the average replacement rate has a positive effect on
unemployment. It suggests that the above described adverse effects of unem-
ployment benefits are stronger. The size of the coefficients is also very much
reasonable. On the other hand, higher initial unemployment benefits slightly
lower unemployment. This fact might support our hypothesis that a higher level
of initial unemployment benefits enables unemployed to find a better matched
job, but generally, higher unemployment benefits (represented by the net aver-
age replacement rate) cause higher unemployment. The third variable connected
to unemployment benefits, which should represent the duration of unemploy-
ment benefits (ubendur), seems to lower unemployment. This is, unfortunately,
against both previous literature and any economic reasoning. We adopted the
definition of this variable (ubendur = anrr/nrr1) from Bassalini and Duval
(2006). In their study ubendur had the expected positive sign which was prob-
ably caused by the fact that both anrr and nrr1 had positive signs. Whereas
in our regression nrr1 had a negative sign, thus it might overturn the sign of
ubendur .
The other institutional variable that turned out significant in all the specifica-
tions is almpu. The impact of ALMP on unemployment is a delicate issue which
has been addressed from both microeconomic and macroeconomic perspective.
It might as well be due to the fact that the other labour market institutions
are rather stable, strongly past dependent and very uneasy to reform. On the
contrary, both the level of expenditures on ALMP and types of programmes
are more easily adjustable. In previous macroeconomic literature, a consensus
has been reached about the negative sign of ALMP, but totally not about the
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magnitude and significance. Boon and Van Ours (2004) and Nickell (1998) are
very optimistic about the effects of ALMP on unemployment, whereas Scarpetta
(1996) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) consider these effects rather negligible.
Studies from the microeconomic perspective focus more on the evaluating of the
individual programmes. Hence, it is a difficult task to summarize their main
findings. Nevertheless, we can state that the efficiency of ALMP is strongly
dependent on the set-up of individual programmes (Martin, 1998; Martin and
Grubb, 2001; Calmfors et al., 2002; Carling and Richardson, 2004).
The possible mechanisms via which can ALMP reduce unemployment are mainly:
increased efficiency of the job-matching process and amended human capital of
unemployed. Almpu turned out to be highly significant in all our specifications.
It has the expected negative sign and a strikingly high coefficient. But we need
to understand that the variable almpu is in very small units. The maximum
ALMP expenditures in % of GDP is 1.66 and the minimum is only 0.04 with
mean equal to 0.56. Furthermore, we wanted to extract the endogenous rela-
tionship of the level of expenditures on ALMP with the level of unemployment.
In other words, the fact that countries with higher unemployment might tent to
invest more in ALMP. Hence we created the variable almpu as a ratio of ALMP
expenditures to the particular level of unemployment. As the result, almpu is
even one decimal place lower with the maximum, minimum and mean equal to
0.489, 0.004, 0.098 respectively. Still the estimated effects of almpu are very
strong. If we took a country with 10 % of unemployment which spends 1 % of
GDP on ALMP, we may consider this country as an average country because
almpu would be equal to 0.1 (mean is 0.098), and this country would increase its
spending on ALMP to 1.1 % of GPD, it would ceteris paribus lower the unem-
ployment rate by 2.77 pp based on our baseline equation. This result is similar
to Nickell (1998) who concludes that an increase in almpu by 10 pp should
lower unemployment by 1.92 pp. In spite of this accordance, we should remain
very cautious about drawing any strong conclusions about the magnitude of the
effects of ALMP on unemployment.
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Figure 5: Output Gap and Cyclical Unemployment (%), 2001-2011
Source: Author´s calculations on the basis of the OECD (2013).
The measure for output gap appeared to be absolutely significant in all five
specifications in which it was included. It confirms the importance of the cyclical
component of unemployment. There is no question that business cycle played an
important role in the development of unemployment during the observed period.
As described in the previous section, in the years before the financial crisis (2005-
2007), European economies were overheating, on the contrary, the years after
the crisis were charecterized by a strong recession. Figure 6 depicts the evolution
of both outgap and cyclical unemployment (cuhp) in individual countries. The
cyclical component was gained as the residual component from above mentioned
filtering of urt1564 by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Understandably, the
two curves crosses each other quite regularly around the zero value. The outgap
curve tends to be much more volatile than the cuhp curve. The most volatile
path followed Ireland which experienced the steepest growth (9.478 in 2007)
only to drop into the deepest recession just three years later (-7.785 in 2010).
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The cyclical component reached its minimum (helped to lower unemployment
the most) in Spain in 2007 (-4.867) and its maximum in Greece in the last year
of the period (4.806).
The estimated coefficient of outgap has both the negative sign and the reasonable
size. In the baseline equation, in the situation when output is 1 % above its
potential, the cyclical component of unemployment should lower unemployment
by 0. 349 pp. This values seem to reflect the reality quite adequately.
In the second specification (sh), we substituted the measure of business cycle
(outgap) by two other variables which might capture the current macroeconomic
situation. Terms of trade shock (totshock) and real interest rate shock (rint-




rintshock = long-term interest rate - annual change in GDP deflator (in %)16.
Nunziata (2001) assumes that adverse shifts in totshock can have effects on la-
bour costs via wage pressures. These wage pressures are caused by an increase
of a difference between consumer (import) and producer prices (Layard et al.,
1991). And as Nunziata (2002) confirms, the impact of shocks and institutions
on labour costs is usually in line with the impact on unemployment. Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000) brought into the light a possible importance of rintshock on
the evolution of European unemployment. They point out to the fact that the
real interest rate became sharply negative in the second half of the 1970s and
then largely positive in the 1980s and the 1990s. The possible mechanism how
changes in the real interest rate can affect unemployment is through changes in
capital accumulation, which in the case of given wages, can lead to a shift of
labour demand.
The estimates of the effects of both shocks are rather inconclusive. The changes
in the real interest rate appear absolutely significant for the development of the
unemployment rates. The coefficient of rintshock is positive, thus this finding is
perfectly in line with the previous literature, where the real interest rate shocks
tented to be positive and significant (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bassalini and
Duval, 2006; and others). This holds in spite of the fact that the development of
the real interest rate was much less fluctuant than in the second half of the 20th
century. The size of rintshock coefficient suggests that if the real interest rate
increases by 1 pp, it will lead to an increase in unemployment by 0.353 pp. The
16The formulas of the shocks were taken from Bassalini and Duval (2006). For more in-
formation, see the Description of Data and Variables in the chapter Methodology.
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change in the real interest rate can be caused by both positive and negative shifts
in both nominal interest rate and inflation. For instance, if a nominal interest
rate increases by 1 pp, in the situation when the inflation remains unchanged,
it will lead to an increase in unemployment by 0.353 pp.
Figure 6: Nominal and Real Interest Rates, 2001-2011
Source: Author´s calculations on the basis of the OECD (2013).
Figure 6 depicts both nominal interest rates (ltir) and real interest rates (rint-
shock), cleaned of inflation by using GDP deflator. The real interest rate hardly
ever fell into negative figures. For longer time only in case of Norway which was
highly rated by the markets, among other reasons due to incomes from the oil
production, therefore it had very low nominal interest rates, but at the same
time, it experienced quite high inflation (even above 10 % in 2008). The other
reason for positive real interest rates is relatively stable and low inflation during
the observed period. The only other time when inflation got into double digits
was in Hungary in the very first year of the period (11.5 %).
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Terms of trade shock is significant but only on the 10 % level of significance.
The negative sign of its coefficient is very problematic for interpreting as it
goes against both previous literature and the economic sense. We cannot find
any economic justification why an increase in import or import prices should
contribute to lower unemployment.
In the third specification (mw), we aim at analysing the effects of minimal wage
on unemployment. Due to the fact that reliable internationally comparable data
are only in countries where minimal wage is statutory, we had to restrain the
sample to 13 countries - 143 observations. Theoretically, if we accept the as-
sumption of perfectly competitive markets, any minimum wage set above the
market clearing level, should lead to involuntary unemployment. The previous
studies which dealt with the effects of statutory minimum wage on unemploy-
ment (Elmeskov et al., 1998; Bassalini and Duval, 2006) concluded that the
effects are ambiguous and hardly ever significant. Our estimates confirmed this
hypothesis as rminmed do not appear significant.
The logarithmic transformation is used in the forth specification to examine
whether the logarithmic data fit the model better. The biggest distinction from
the previous specifications is the fact that the degree of corporatism and trade
union density are significant on 1 % and 5 % level respectively. Strong trade
unions have powers to push wages above the market clearing level. Nevertheless,
it is believed that the impact of unions on unemployment is strongly depend-
ent on the level of centralisation of collective bargaining. Decentralized wage
bargaining does not allow unions to push wages too high, which should pre-
vent from increasing of unemployment. On the contrary, in very centralized
wage bargaining, unions internalise the negative effects of too high wages - loss
of employment, therefore it leads to moderation of wage claims (Bassalini and
Duval, 2006). Some of the previous studies support this “hump-shaped” hypo-
thesis that both decentralized and highly centralized wage bargaining structures
lead to lower unemployment (Scarpetta, 1996; Elmeskov et al., 1998). On the
other hand, estimates from Nunziata (2002) do not confirm this hypothesis.
In our case, the more centralized wage bargaining should marginally increase
unemployment, whereas stronger unions should, also marginally, lower unem-
ployment.
In the last two specifications we use alternative dependent variables. In the
fifth specification (su), we model the effects of institutions on structural (core)
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unemployment. We gained structural unemployment by filtering off the resid-
ual (cyclical) component of urt1564. We deal with core unemployment, which
should not be influenced by the effects of business cycle, therefore we omit out-
gap from our equation. The results are analogous to the results from previous
specifications. All variables connected with unemployment benefits and almpu
are very significant. Furthermore, tundens is significant on the 10 % level, but
with very marginal effects as an increase in trade union density by 1 % should
lower unemployment only by 0.017.
Figure 7: Long-Term Unemployment to Unemployment (%), 2001-
2011
Source: Author´s calculations based on the sources from the list of variables.
The dependent variable in the last specification (ltu) is long-term unemploy-
ment. We use the same explanatory variables as in the baseline specification,
it means that the measure of macroeconomic situation is also included. The
impact of a recession/boom on long-term unemployment is still a bit different
than on aggregate unemployment. At the beginning of a recession, people are
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made redundant which creates a wave of newly unemployed, but this relatively
and temporarily lowers the share of long-term unemployed to all unemployed
(Jurajda and Munich, 2003). Subsequently, the number and also the share of
long-term unemployed starts to grow as a part of the unemployed loses their
work habits and do not come back to work. This phenomenon was described
in the so called hysteresis effect and outlines the fact that a part of the cyclical
unemployment transforms into structural unemployment. In other words, if a
recession lasts long enough or it is deep enough, it increases the natural rate of
unemployment of a particular economy. Hněvkovský (2012) comes up with the
hypothesis that this process should work also in the opposite direction, i.e. if
the cyclical component lowers unemployment for a substantially long period of
time, it should subsequently cause a drop in the natural rate of unemployment
as well.
There is a considerable variation in the incidence of long-term unemployment
across European countries. Some of the countries had the share of the long-
term unemployment to unemployment constantly around 20 %. It is a group of
countries which exhibits low levels of aggregate unemployment as well - Scand-
inavian countries and Austria. At the other end of the spectrum, there are
countries in which the number of long-term unemployed oscillated around 50 %
- Germany, Greece, Italy, etc. Absolutely the worst situation was in Slovakia
where long-term unemployed created almost 80 % of all unemployed in years
2005-2007.
The effects of all variables (with an exception of twcoup) on long-term unem-
ployment appear significant. The most of the coefficients are lower than in the
equations for aggregate unemployment, but if we consider the sizes of both long-
term and aggregate unemployment, the coefficients are proportionally smaller.
The negative sing in front of corp suggests that centralized wage bargaining
should lower long-term unemployment. Unlike in the equation for aggregate
unemployment, the employment protection legislation is highly significant with
a positive sign. There are several channels through which epl might affect un-
employment. Firstly, it influences wages both positively and negatively. Firms
might offer lower wages to workers as a compensation for incurring dismissing
costs. On the contrary, incumbent workers are better protected, thus they have
bigger bargaining power. As the result of wage tensions, firms reduce hiring
costs. This increases the duration of unemployment, but also the opportunity
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costs of unemployment are higher, hence job seekers are willing to accept worse
paid jobs. As the whole, epl lowers labour turnover (both hiring and layoff)
and increases the duration of unemployment (Bassalini and Duval, 2006). The
previous literature have not found any clear-cut empirical effects of epl on un-
employment. In line with our findings, Bassalini and Duval (2006) state that epl
should contribute to higher long-term unemployment as it prolongs the duration
of unemployment and lowers labour turnover.
R-squared of the specifications oscillated between 0.4 and 0.6. The lowest R-
squared was in the fourth specification (su) where the dependent variable was
structural unemployment. We can say that in this specification, we analysed
the net effects of institutions as we did not include any measures for the mac-
roeconomic situation. The baseline specification stood somewhere in the middle
with R-squared equalled to 0.474. It was slightly higher than for the specifica-
tion where we substituted outgap with the shock variables. The data fitted the
model best in the specification with minimum wage (R-squared = 0.594).
4.2.3 LSDV
In the previous sub-section, we used pooled OLS model for estimates, a method
which neglects the structure of the panel. Now we employ LSDV model which
is identical to pooled OLS with the exception that it includes an additional
set of dummy variables that allow us to resolve the omitted variable bias. In
other words, we add a dummy variable for each country (with the exception of
the first country whose individual effect is basically reflected in general inter-
cept), therefore we allow every country to have a different value of intercept.
This dummy variables enable us to account for unobserved heterogeneity across
countries. The pros of LSDV estimator is that we can see the particular values
(coefficients) in front of each dummy variable, i.e. we know the values of each
country´s individual intercept. On the contrary, with the high number of entit-
ies, LSDV model becomes chaotic and it also leads to loss of a lot of degrees of
freedom. The baseline specification for LSDV model looks following:
urt1564 = α+ β1anrr+ β2nrr1 + β3ubendur+ β4twcoup+ β5epl+ β5tudens+
β6corp+ β7almpu+ γ1outgap+ δ1c2 + ...+ δ20c21.
To check the assumptions of the model, we use the same tests as in the case
of pooled OLS. The homoskedasticity is not rejected by White test, but it is
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strongly rejected by Breusch-Pagan test. We decided to use the robust regres-
sion to control for heteroskedasticity. The residuals are more normally dis-
tributed than in the case of pooled OLS, but after running Shapiro-Wilk test
and graphical analysis from Q-Q plot and histogram of residuals, we rejected
the normality as well (figure 8). The another problem that might occur while
adding dummy variables controlling for individual effects into the equation is
an increased collinearity between variables. This fact was confirmed in our case.
The VIF exhibits enormously high values - the only two explanatory variables
that had lower values than the benchmark 10 were outgap and almpu. Mean
VIF equalled to 31.28. This is a serious drawback that needs to be addressed.
Figure 8: Q-Q plot and Histogram, LSDV, Bs
Source: Author´s calculations based on the sources from the list of variables.
We decided to take no further remedies and to present the results from LSDV
model only as figurative and without proper interpretation. We did so from
the reason that estimates of the coefficients from FE model, which is pivotal
for us, are identical as from LSDV model. The differences are only in sizes of
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standard errors of the variables, therefore also in significance of the variables
and the overall goodness of fit of the model. Hence, we will discuss the findings
in the next sub-section and the results in table 6 are only illustrative. We also
did not include coefficients for individual country dummies in table 6 as we find
it unnecessary. One more important test needs to be run on LSDV regression
before using FE model. It is F-test with the hypothesis that individual dummy
variables are jointly equal to zero. We can strongly reject the hypothesis, hence
we are justified to use FE model as it is better than pooled OLS.
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Table 6: Unemployment Equation, LSDV, 2001-2011

















































































































Observations 231 231 143 231 231 231
R-squared 0.860 0.808 0.875 0.920 0.851 0.858
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** ,*** denote
statistical significance at 15%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. In the 3rd spe-
cification (log) all the variables are in logarithmic form, with the exception of
outgap.
Source: Author´s calculations based on the sources from the list of variables.
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4.2.4 FE
Fe model, as well as LSDV model, assumes that there is some unobserved het-
erogeneity across countries which may bias the predictor. In FE model, this
individual heterogeneity across countries is captured by unknown not time-
depending intercepts that vary across countries. The logic is the same as
in LSDV model where this individual characteristics are captured by country
dummy variables creating not time-depending intercepts as well. The only dif-
ference is that in LSDV model we estimate the coefficients of dummy variables,
therefore the individual characteristics are known, and in FE model the indi-
vidual characteristics are captured in unknown intercepts.
We do not use command regress, as in previous cases, thus we have to use
different tests to check model assumptions. As mentioned above, the F-test
rejected the hypothesis that the constant term is the same across countries,
therefore there are some individual characteristics that may influence the es-
timates. Hence, FE model will yield us better estimates then pooled OLS. To
check the assumption of homoskedasticity, we perform modified Wald test for
groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression models. The hypothesis
of homoskedasticity is strongly rejected. The distribution of residuals is the
same as in the case of LSDV model (figure 8) - we reject the assumption of nor-
mality. We reject the hypothesis in Wooldridge test for serial autocorrelation,
thus the data have first-order autocorrelation. To deal with these drawbacks in
the assumptions, we should use the option cluster, but Stata 11 already clusters
the data in the option robust, thus robust regression should prevent any pos-
sible biases, mostly smaller standard deviations of the coefficients which would
cause higher significance of the variables. This fact was also supported by our
estimates. When we ran regression without the option robust, standard devi-
ations of the coefficients were smaller and the variables exhibited much higher
significance.
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Table 7: Unemployment Equation, FE, 2001-2011

















































































































Observations 231 231 143 231 231 231
R-squared 0.577 0.418 0.681 0.698 0.362 0.446
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** ,*** denote
statistical significance at 15%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. In the 3rd spe-
cification (log) all the variables are in logarithmic form, with the exception of
outgap.
Source: Author´s calculations based on the sources from the list of variables.
Table 7 lists the estimates from FE model. By the first look at the table, it
is visible that the variables are less significant than in the previous (pooled
OLS, LSDV) models. In the baseline specification, outgap is significant at 1
%, almpu at 5%, and anrr, twcoup and epl are significant at 15 % level. The
possible mechanism through which the variables can influence unemployment
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were thoroughly discussed at pooled OLS model, thus they will not be discussed
here. The exception is twcoup which appeared insignificant in pooled OLS
model, hence we will focus on it in more detail now.
To remind, in our case twcoup is defined as the difference between labour costs
to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of the employee for
a single-earner couple with two children earning 100% of AW. If we consider
perfectly competitive labour markets, workers would bear the whole tax bur-
den through lower net wages and the equilibrium unemployment would remain
unchanged. The assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets is rather
theoretical, in practise it might be violated by several causes. For instance,
wages can be set above market-clearing levels, workers bargain, at least par-
tially, over net not gross wages, and there must not be any institutional con-
straints preventing from shifting the tax burden onto wages. If these conditions
are met (labour markets are imperfect), an increase in the tax wedge cannot be
put solely on workers, which causes pressures on labour costs and an increase in
unemployment (Bassalini and Duval, 2006). Most of the previous studies came
to the conclusion that higher labour taxes lead to a rise in unemployment, e.g.
Daveri and Tabellini (2000) conclude that higher tax wedges lead to higher la-
bour costs which are greatly responsible for rising unemployment. On the other
hand, some of the studies found the tax wedge insignificant for the development
of unemployment (Scarpetta, 1996; Baker et al., 2003).
Twcoup is significant in 5 out of 6 specifications (but only on 15 % or 5 % levels).
Both the positive sign and the value of the coefficient is in line with the previous
literature confirming the hypothesis that an increase in labour taxes influences
unemployment through lowered labour demand. In the baseline specification,
the coefficients for anrr and outgap are very much the same as in the case of
pooled OLS model. The effect of almpu is lower, nonetheless, it still remains
quite strong. The negative sign of epl suggests that the pros of more stringent
employment protection outweigh the cons of lower labour turnover.
Unlike the previous models, neither totshock, but mainly, nor rintshock appear
significant. Minimum wage is again insignificant, but interestingly, in this spe-
cification trade union density is strongly significant with a positive sign. This
has probably nothing to do with adding minimum wage into the equation, but
rather because we use only 13 countries in which there is statutory minimum
wage. Therefore, for this sub-sample of countries, the level of tundens might
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be more important than in the whole sample. It looks like the logarithmic
transformation of the variables is not very reasonable for our data as none of
the institutional variables is significant (with the exception of almpu). In the
structural unemployment equation, both anrr and twcoup are significant with
stronger effects than previously. Four institutional variables (anrr, twcoup, tun-
dens and almpu) are significant in the long-term unemployment equation, but
all only at 15 % level. As in the previous models, the coefficients are propor-
tionally smaller.
The data fit the model reasonably good. The R-squared of specifications ranges
from 0.35 to 0.7. The R-squared is the lowest for the equation explaining struc-
tural unemployment. On the other hand, the highest R-squared is for the log-
arithmic transformation. The logarithmic transformation of variables usually
increases the goodness of fit of panel data, but it needs also an economic justi-
fication and significant variables. In our case, none of the institutional variables
is significant, thus we do not highly regard this specification. We decided to
implement the logarithmic equation only due to the fact that some of the pre-
ceding studies opted for it. The second highest R-squared is in the specification
with minimum wage, however, the variable rminmed is insignificant and its ef-
fect is negligible. The cause is rather that the data fit the model better for the
sub-sample of 13 countries with statutory minimum wage. The lowered hetero-
geneity across countries might as well play a part, as the countries which are
not covered in the sub-sample are mostly the countries with better functioning
labour markets (Scandinavian countries, Austria, Switzerland, Germany). The
baseline specification is again in the middle with the R-squared equal to 0.57.
The other method to estimate panel data is using random effects model. The
difference between RE and FE model is that, unlike FE model, the variation
across countries is assumed to be random and it cannot be captured only by
different not time-depending intercepts for each country. To decide whether
we should use RE model, we firstly used Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier
test which rejected the null hypothesis that variances across countries is zero,
thus RE model is more appropriate than pooled OLS. Then we ran Hausman
specification test to see whether RE model is suitable. Under the null hypo-
thesis RE model is consistent and more efficient than FE model. But Hausman
specification test rejected the null hypothesis, hence RE model is inconsistent
and we cannot apply it on the data. This result is also in accordance with the
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general structure of our dataset, as the individual characteristics should differ
across countries, but within countries, there should be a pattern that can be
captured by an individual country intercept.
4.2.5 Comparison of the Models
In all of the models, the classical assumptions (homoskedasticity, normality of
residuals) were not satisfied. Therefore, we were forced to use option robust to
prevent bias estimates. This remedy caused that some of the variables stopped
being significant (mostly in FE model). Firstly, we used pooled OLS model
which neglects the structure of the panel. The results for the baseline specific-
ation gained from pooled OLS suggested that some of the variables are highly
significant for the development of unemployment (three institutional variables
connected with unemployment benefits, almpu, and outgap). Both variables
standing for shocks were significant, especially the real interest rate seems to
have been substantial. The findings for the long-term unemployment specifica-
tion were even more conclusive as all variables but twcoup appeared significant
at 1 % level.
Furthermore, we applied LSDV model, which estimates the coefficients as pooled
OLS with additional dummy variables for each country. This dummy variables
account for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. F-test rejected the hy-
pothesis that individual dummy variables are equal to zero, hence LSDV and
FE models yield better estimates than pooled OLS. The coefficients gained from
LSDV model are identical with the ones from FE model. The substantial dif-
ferences are in significance of coefficients and the goodness of fit. Most of the
variables were highly significant in LSDV model and the R-squared exceeded 0.8
in all specifications. These results seem plausible, but there is a problem with
big multicollinearity between variables in LSDV model. Hence, these results
should not be overestimated.
FE model is pivotal for us. As mentioned above, the coefficients were the same
as from LSDV model, but the variables were much less significant. In the
baseline equation, besides highly significant outgap and almpu, only twcoup,
anrr, and epl were significant at 15 % level. Neither of the shock variables were
significant. The situation was very much the same in the other specifications
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as the only highly significant variables remained outgap and almpu. Hausman
specification test proved RE model to be inconsistent, thus we did not employ it.
To summarize the comparison between models, pooled OLS and LSDV model
gained rather plausible results over the effects of labour market institutions on
the development of unemployment in the period 2001-2001, but the estimates
from FE model seem to be the most precise and realistic.
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5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
We examined the effects of labour market institutions on unemployment relating
to the increase of unemployment from the second half of the 1960s. Some of
the scholars came to rather strong conclusions over the possibility of explaining
the increase in unemployment through the effects of labour market institutions
(Nickell, 1998; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nunziata, 2002; Bassalini and
Duval, 2006). In this work, we decided to adopt the same strategy, namely to
use macroeconomic cross-country, time series analysis, and to check whether
these conclusions are still valid even in the up-to-date data.
On our dataset, which covers 21 European countries over the 2001-2011 period,
we applied three different econometric models. From pooled OLS model, we
gained the results that are more or less in line with the majority of previous
literature, but F-test pointed out to unobserved heterogeneity across countries,
thus FE model turned out to be more appropriate in our case. The results
from FE model are far less conclusive with none of the institutional variables
(except for the variable capturing the effects of ALMP on unemployment which
stands a bit aside) appeared significant at 5 % level. These findings are in
accordance with some of the preceding studies (Belot and Van Ours, 2001;
Baker et al., 2003). We came to the conclusion that the stable character of
labour market institutions prevent them from accounting for the majority of
the volatile development of unemployment in the turbulent period 2001-2011.
We consider the chosen period as one of the key factors why the labour mar-
ket institutions appeared mostly insignificant. The preceding scholars mostly
worked with datasets covering longer periods of time with much less volatile
economic, as well as unemployment, development. Therefore, labour market
institutions were able to capture this gradual development. Whereas, our ob-
served period was characterized by both the very strong economic growth and
subsequently the deep crisis. The development of unemployment was not any
more moderate. We can hardly expect that the changes in institutions over
a decade can capture enormous increases in unemployment - around 10 pp in
Spain, Portugal or Ireland, as well as big drops in unemployment - more than 8
pp in Poland.
The importance of business cycle was confirmed by our estimates as the meas-
ure of output gap turned out highly significant in every specification. From
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the baseline specification we got the following figures: if output is 1 % below
its potential, it leads to an increase in unemployment by 0.371 pp. The effects
of output gap (the cyclical component of unemployment) were the strongest in
Ireland, where the economic overheating lowered unemployment by 3.5 % in
2007, and only three years later, the cyclical component contributed to higher
unemployment by almost 3 %. These numbers are in accordance with the find-
ings from the previous studies (e.g. Bassalini and Duval, 2006). Output gap
contributed also to higher long-term unemployment - by 0.164 pp per every per-
cent output stays below its potential. This finding confirms the above discussed
hysteresis hypothesis. We were also keen on examining the effects of institutions
on structural/core unemployment. For this purpose, we subtracted the cyclical
component of unemployment by using Hodrick-Prescott filter. Both the average
replacement rate and tax wedge appeared significant at 5 % level with positive
signs, suggesting that more generous unemployment benefits and higher labour
taxes contribute to higher core unemployment.
Some of the previous studies (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bassalini and Duval,
2006) emphasised the importance of shocks and their interactions with institu-
tions. We also examined the role of two shocks - terms of trade shock and real
interest rate shock, by substituting them for the measure of macroeconomic
situation (output gap). The real interest rate appeared highly significant with
a positive sign in pooled OLS model, but in FE model, neither deteriorations
in the terms of trade nor changes in the long-term real interest rates were signi-
ficant. Due to insignificance of both shock variables, we decided to abolish the
initial intention to examine the effects of interaction of shocks with institutions
on unemployment. We might as well aim at enhancement of shock variables and
analysing their interactions with institutions in future research.
The impact of ALMP on unemployment has been addressed from both microe-
conomic and macroeconomic perspective. In previous macroeconomic literature,
consensus has been reached about the negative sign of ALMP, but totally not
about the magnitude and significance. Our findings tend to Boon and Van Ours
(2004) and Nickell (1998) who are very optimistic about the effects of ALMP on
unemployment. From the estimates of the baseline specification we found that
an increase in ALMP by 10 pp (in case that the particular unemployment rate
remains unchanged) lowers unemployment by 1.82 pp. These findings suggest
that ALMP can work as an extremely effective tool for tackling high European
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unemployment. On the other hand, with regard to the ambiguous conclusions
from the preceding literature, these results shall be interpreted cautiously. We
also acknowledge that the efficiency of ALMP is strongly dependent on the
set-up of individual ALMP programmes (see e.g. Martin and Grubb, 2001).
If we should draw some policy implications from our empirical analysis, we
would put emphasis on ALMP, as both the level of expenditures on ALMP and
types of programmes are more easily adjustable than the rest of labour market
institutions. The changes in the other labour market institutions (generosity
of unemployment benefits, levels of minimum wage and labour taxes, etc.) are
usually conditioned by more complex reforms which are harder to implement
through the legislation process. Also the effects of ALMP are much more sig-
nificant and clear-cut in our estimates. Nevertheless, we analysed the overall
macroeconomic effects of ALMP on unemployment, therefore some of the cat-
egories of ALMP might be much more effective than the others. Furthermore,
we stress the necessity to combine our findings with microeconomic evaluations
of the efficiency of individual ALMP programmes. The impact of ALMP is also
less significant for the development of long-term unemployment.
More generous unemployment benefits and higher labour taxes contribute to
higher unemployment. These effects are also evident in the equation of long-term
unemployment, but they are the strongest in the case of core unemployment.
Hence, for addressing structural and long-term unemployment, policymakers
might try to attenuate the negative incentives of generous unemployment bene-
fits and lower labour tax burdens for employees rather than invest into ALMP.
On the contrary, the effects of initial unemployment benefits are not so straight
forward any more. In most of the specifications, initial unemployment benefits
are insignificant and also the sign of the coefficient changes. The assumption
that current levels of minimum wage in Europe contribute to higher unemploy-
ment is not supported by our estimates. We take this finding as preliminary
and with a vague predicative value due to the fact that we operated only with
13 countries with statutory minimum wage and our empirical analysis was not
particularly aimed at analysing the effects of minimum wage, therefore we avoid
drawing any implications out of it.
Labour market institutional set-ups surely have some effects on unemployment
in Europe. Some of the previous studies came to rather robust findings over
the possibility to explain the rise of unemployment in the second half of the
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20th century solely by analysing the effects of labour market institutions and
their interactions with macroeconomic shocks. Even though the data fitted our
model reasonably well, the results from our empirical analysis are less conclus-
ive. First and foremost, we examined the development of unemployment over
a shorter period of time (11 years) with annual observations, and this period
was characterized by both strong economic overheating and subsequently the
consequences of the severe crisis. Hence, even though the cyclical component of
unemployment represented by the measure of output gap captured some of the
variation in unemployment caused by the macroeconomic turmoil, the stable
character of labour market institutions prevented them from explaining the rest
of the volatile development of unemployment during the observed period. We
are convinced that in the case of more stable macroeconomic development, la-
bour market institutions would end up more significant and would be able to
capture more of the evolution of unemployment in Europe. Nevertheless, we
believe there are some valuable theoretical conclusions and policy implications
that can be taken from our empirical analysis. Namely, ALMP can reduce unem-
ployment significantly, both generous unemployment benefits and high labour
taxes increase especially long-term and core unemployment, and the effects of
stringent EPL and union density are ambiguous.
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Prob > chi2 = 0.000







Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of urt1564
chi2(1) = 25.31
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z


















Prob > chi2 = 0.252







Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of urt1564
chi2(1) = 72.15
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z
residuals 231 0.973 4.547 3.510 0.000
Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF
ubendur 212.42 corp 25.06 c12 12.71 c11 7.63
anrr 122.85 c4 24.42 c6 10.46 almpu 6.98
tundens 108.11 epl 22.24 c2 10.21 c7 4.90
c21 63.08 c10 20.82 c3 9.21 c8 4.23
nrr1 61.67 twcoup 18.59 c17 9.18 c15 3.42
c19 33.04 c16 18.23 c18 7.98 outgap 1.40
c5 26.82 c14 14.79 c20 7.83 Mean VIF 31.28




Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
chi2 (21) = 1560.70
Prob>chi2 = 0.000
Pesaran’s test of cross sectional independence
H0: cross sectional independence = 6.791
Prob = 0.000
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements = 0.405
v
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
F( 1, 20) = 67.655
Prob > F = 0.0000
RE Model
Hausman Specification test
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Hypotheses:
1. There are not only economic, but also policy and institutional determinants of
unemployment that might come through as statistically significant.
2. Business cycle played a vital role in the development of unemployment in the EU in
recent years.
3. ALMPs can work as an effective tool for tackling unemployment in the EU.
4. High unemployment benefits amplify the impact of adverse shocks on unemployment.
5. Policies and institutions are likely to contribute to unemployment patterns via
interaction with macroeconomic shocks
Methodology:
Initially, obtained data will be analysed and variables will be stratified in line with the
existing literature. Due to the fact that the cross-country time-series analysis is used,
standard panel data methods will be employed - pooled OLS regression, fixed-effects model
and random-effects model.The latter part will consist of analysing the interactions between
policies and institutions with macroeconomic shocks. In order to achieve this, the
non-linear least squares unemployment equation with interactions between time-invariant
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